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Abstract
This paper deals with the notion of residual income, which may be defined as the surplus profit
that residues after a capital charge (opportunity cost) has been covered. While the origins of the
notion trace back to the 19th century, in-depth theoretical investigations and widespread real-life
applications are relatively recent and concern an interdisciplinary field connecting management ac-
counting, corporate finance and financial mathematics (Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Peccati, 1987, 1989,
1991; Stewart, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Arnold and Davies, 2000; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin,
Petty and Rich, 2003). This paper presents both a historical outline of its birth and development
and an overview of the main recent contributions regarding capital budgeting decisions, production
and sales decisions, implementation of optimal portfolios, forecasts of asset prices and calculation of
intrinsic values. A most recent theory, the systemic-value-added approach (also named lost-capital
paradigm), provides a different definition of residual income, consistent with arbitrage theory. En-
folded in Keynes’s (1936) notion of user cost and forerun by Pressacco and Stucchi (1997), the theory
has been formally introduced in Magni (2000a,b,c; 2001a,b; 2003), where its properties are thor-
oughly investigated as well as its relations with the standard theory; two different lost-capital metrics
have been considered, for value-based management purposes, by Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000) and
Young and O’Byrne (2001). This work illustrates the main properties of the two theories and their
relations, and provides a minimal guide to construction of performance metrics in the two approaches.
Keywords and phrases. Accounting, finance, economics, investment analysis, residual income, excess
profit, firm valuation, net present value, opportunity cost, counterfactual, performance measurement.
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1 Introduction
Consider an economic agent and consider the profit originated by her business; then consider the profit
that would be (or have been) generated if she pursued (had pursued) an alternative business. Take the
difference between the former and the latter: the result is what is usually called residual income or excess
profit. In essence, the actual income is contrasted with a hypothetical, fictitious income foregone by
the investor, whose nature is that of an opportunity cost. This concept is thus originated by one single
question:
What would the profit be (have been) if the investor (had) selected a different course of action?
The idea of excess profit dates back to the eighteenth century, but only in the last twenty-five years the
literature on residual income has flourished in various fields such as management accounting, corporate
finance, financial mathematics. This notion is highly significant because of its theoretical and applicative
implications for project and firm valuation, capital budgeting decisions, performance measurement, man-
agement compensation, tax policies.1 This paper offers a critical review of the notion of residual income.
In section 2 the basic constituents (income and opportunity cost) are presented and the counterfactual
features of residual income are underlined. Section 3 focusses on the standard theory of residual income:
some early contributions are mentioned which connect excess profit and a project/firm’s present (market)
value; the formal relations among return rates, discount functions, accounting values, market values are
summarized stressing the roles of Peasnell’s (1981, 1982a) and Peccati’s (1987, 1989) analyses; in section
4 an overview is presented of the use of this notion for valuation and for managerial purposes and the
most prominent issues are underlined. Section 5 examines a most recent theory of residual income, orig-
inally labelled Systemic Value Added (Magni, 2000a,b,c; 2001a,b, 2003, 2004), later renamed lost-capital
paradigm (2007a,b); relations with the standard residual income theory and with arbitrage theory are
also illustrated. In section 6 some models are constructed on the basis of the two paradigms: they are
classified according to the perspective employed (entity, claimholders’, equity) and to the implied notions
of income and capital (accounting-based, internal-rate-of-return-based, market-based). Section 7 presents
a numerical illustration and section 8 ends the paper. To avoid pedantry in definitions, main notational
conventions and acronyms are collected in Tables 0a-0b.
2 Residual income and its basic constituents
Income. Income, profit, earnings, interest, return: these terms are massively used in such fields as
economic theory, finance, accounting, actuarial and financial mathematics. Income from the point of view
of economists is referred to an individual consumer and is typically defined as the maximum which can be
consumed by an individual in a determined period without impairing her wealth or capital (Hicks, 1946;
see also Fetter, 1937). From the point of view of accountants income is also called profit or earnings,
and is referred to the increase in a firm’s assets after distributions of dividends to shareholders (Canning,
1Under the Allowance-for-Corporate-Equity system (also known as the imputed income method), only excess profits are
taxed, whereas normal returns to capital are exempt from corporate income taxes (Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Rose and
Wiswesser, 1998; Andersson et al., 1998. See also Sørensen, 1994, 1998 on the Dual Income Tax).
1929; Penman, 2007). In the theory of financial contracts (and in actuarial sciences) the notion of interest
is used since ancient times to represent the remuneration of the lender (Van de Mieroop, 2005) and is
computed as the difference between the installment paid by the borrower and the principal repayment
(Francis, 2004; Fabozzi, 2006; Promislow, 2006; Werner and Sotskov, 2006). The notion of return in
capital budgeting is referred to a project: in a one-period project return is the difference between the
end-of-period payoff and the initial outlay. In security analysis, return denotes dividends plus capital
gain. All these concepts are conceptually and formally equivalent and may be conjoined in a unified
formal framework:
economic agent’s remuneration︷︸︸︷
pit =
payment in cash︷︸︸︷
at +
change in capital︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wt − wt−1) . (1)
The fundamental equation (1) is a most general theoretical umbrella covering such terms as income, profit,
earnings, return, interest, which may be viewed, conceptually and formally, as synonyms (see Table 1).2
Two variants of eq. (1) are particularly important: an interest-rate form is
rt =
at + (wt − wt−1)
wt−1
(2)
with rt:=pit/wt−1. From the point of view of a lender, rt is the interest rate on the debt; from the point
of view of an accountant, rt is the accounting rate of return; from the point of view of an investor, rt is
just an internal rate of return of a one-period project (because −wt−1 + (at+wt)/(1 + rt) = 0). A second
variant of the fundamental equation (1) describes the evolution of the capital through time:
wt = wt−1(1 + rt)− at. (3)
This form stresses the role of the return rate (interest rate) as a driver of capital increase: it is usual in the
construction of amortization tables, in the computation of project balances and in financial and insurance
applications (Levi, 1964; Robichek and Myers, 1965; Teichroew, Robichek, Montalbano, 1965a,b; Hansen,
1972; Peccati, 1991; Promislow, 2006). The fundamental equation (1) alongside its equivalents eqs. (2)
and (3) represent a general schema that links income, cash flow, capital, rate of return (see also Archer
and D’Ambrosio, 1972; Hansen, 1972; Lee, 1985. See also the fundamental eq. (1’) in Samuelson, 1964,
p. 604). This formal framework is suited for describing any conceivable situation where a stream of cash
flows is involved, be it a project, a personal saving account, a financial contract, a security, a business
unit or a firm. Simple as it is formally, this schema represents a major converging force of economic
theory, finance and accounting.
Opportunity cost. “You face a choice. You must now decide whether to read this [article], to
read something else, to think silent thoughts, or perhaps to write a bit for yourself. The value that
2It is worth noting that the term “capital” derives from the medieval latin expression capitalis pars, which was referred to
the principal sum of a money loan (Fetter, 1937, p. 5). The term capital thus originated in a financial context and was only
later extended to include the worth of any kind of business asset or investment, referred to corporations as well as individuals
(Fetter, 1937). This justifies the practice among financial mathematicians (e.g. Peccati, 1987, 1989, 1991; Pressacco and
Stucchi, 1997; Magni, 2000a,b, 2001a,b, 2003) of interpreting a project (or a firm) as a loan (see also Ve´lez-Pareja, 2001,
pp. 6-7). The loan is ideally represented by the investors’ (shareholders’) legal rights. In particular, capital is viewed as a
residual debt: “The corporation owes the capital, it does not own it. The shareholders own it” (Fetter, 1937, p. 9); and
income is viewed as interest: “the profit is equal to interest on the capital value existing at the beginning of the period”
(Hansen, 1972, p. 15). The same idea is at the core of Anthony’s (1975) notion of profit.
you place on the most attractive of these several alternatives is the cost you must pay if you choose to
read this [article] now” (Buchanan, 1969, p.vii). When one calculates the benefit from undertaking a
course of action one must take other available opportunities into account. The most valuable of these
alternatives represents the cost of undertaking that action. If one says ‘it is not worth the cost’ one
means that alternatives are available which one prefers to undertaking the action. The idea of cost as an
opportunity cost has been developed by Austrian economists (in particular Ludwig von Mises) as well as
by economists of the London School of Economics such as Hayek, Coase, Thirlby, Shackle. Conceptually,
it is the result of a counterfactual conditional : the cost of receiving income pit is given by the income
that would have accrued to the investor if the capital had been invested in a different economic activity.
Opportunity cost is an outcome that might occur (ex ante analysis) or that might have occurred (ex post
analysis) if the decision maker selected or had selected a different course of action: “The cost of doing
anything consists of the receipts which could have been obtained if that particular decision had not been
taken.” (Coase, 1938, 1968, p. 118, italics added). Counterfactual conditionals are ubiquitous in daily life
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Wells, Taylor and Turtle, 1987; Roese and Olson, 1995), in philosophy of
science (Goodman, 1947; Kneale, 1950), and are pervasive in economic thinking as well: they are tools
economists often adopt to explore the world and construct their concepts and models (Sugden, 2000;
Hu¨lsmann, 2003).3 Opportunity cost is income of a foregone opportunity; thus, it is a counterfactual
income as opposed to the factual income received (or to be received) in actual facts (see Magni, 2008a,
for a counterfactual analysis of RI and empirical testing).
Residual income. Combining income and opportunity cost means contrasting the factual course of
action with the counterfactual course of action:
Factual course of action
versus
Counterfactual course of action
=⇒ Residual Income ⇐=
Income
versus
Opportunity cost
Mathematically, residual income is a measure of how factual income exceed counterfactual income, that
is, how income exceeds opportunity cost. We have then the following:
Definition 1. Residual income is income in excess of opportunity cost:
Residual Income = Income−Opportunity cost. (4)
Unanimously in the literature, the foregone profit (opportunity cost) is calculated as the product of
the alternative return rate and the capital at the beginning of the period (=i·wt−1), so that eq. (4) is
formalized as
piet = pit − i · wt−1. (5)
The rate i is often called the opportunity cost of capital4 and may be found as a subjectively determined
hurdle rate or, if a perfect capital market is assumed, as the return rate of an alternative comparable in
3See also Lundberg and Frost (1992) for the use of counterfactuals by individuals in financial decision-making.
4The terminology is unfortunate, given that ‘opportunity cost’ means counterfactual income whereas ‘opportunity cost
of capital’ means counterfactual rate of return.
risk to the asset under consideration. Residual income is therefore income that residues after covering
the interest charge on capital, which has the nature of a foregone profit. Such a foregone profit acts as a
benchmark, a norm in the sense of Kahneman and Miller (1986). The counterfactual profit is a normal
profit (e.g. Edey, 1957; Bodenhorn, 1964; Carsberg, 1966; Archer and D’Ambrosio, 1972; Begg, Fisher
and Dornbusch, 1984). Across the years, a plethora of terms have been attached to the idea of a profit in
excess of some normal profit (see Table 2); this paper limits the synonyms to the expressions “residual
income” and “excess profit”.5
3 The standard theory
3.1 The early years
The concept of excess profit may be traced back to Marshall (1890), presumably inspired by Hamilton
(1777), who clearly underlines the counterfactual feature of opportunity cost: “excess of gross profits
above the interest of his stock ... if the profit of his trade be less than his stock would have yielded at
common interest, he may properly account it a losing one” (Hamilton, 1777, vol. II, p. 246, as quoted
in Arnold, 2000, p. 14; italics added. Also quoted in Mepham, 1980, p. 183). Since the last years of the
nineteenth century, this concept was used for valuation purposes: Carsberg (1966) testifies of discounting
procedures involving excess profits rather than cash flows; among others (e.g. Dicksee, 1897), the author
emphasizes Leake’s (1921) contribution to valuation of Goodwill (NPV), obtained by discounting the
surplus of profit over a normal return on capital. The idea of a reasonable, fair return was well accepted
in those years in professional practice: Sloan’s (1929) “fair and equitable” return is just a normal profit
(see Goetzmann and Garstka, 1999). In later years, Preinreich (1936) hints at the equivalence between
the DCF method and the use of excess earnings to find the NPV: “Goodwill is commonly obtained by
discounting ‘excess earnings’. If the original investment (C) is added to the goodwill the same capital
value results as from the discounting of ‘services’ [cash flows]” (p. 131). The link between value and
excess profits is renewed in Preinreich (1937), where the author writes that “the discounted excess profits
plus the recorded value will always give the true fair market value . . . This statement is a simple theorem
of arithmetic” (p. 220). In Preinreich (1938) the author rephrases Hotelling’s formula of the capital
value of a single machine to claim again that “capital value equals the book value, plus the discounted
excess profits” (p. 240). The formal link between DCF valuation and residual income is made more
explicit by Edey (1957). The author assumes a constant perpetual cash flow at=a, which implies zero
change in capital (wt=wt−1=w) so that at=pit=pi (see eq. (1)); after reminding that, for a perpetuity, the
present value is v0=
∑∞
t=1 pi(1 + i)
−t=pii , he shows that the same value may be obtained by capitalizing
the super-profits piet=pi
e and then adding the value of the firm’s net tangible assets:
w +
∞∑
t=1
pie(1 + i)−t = w +
pie
i
= w +
pi − iw
i
=
pi
i
= v0.
5The expression “residual income” is first used in Solomons (1965), who credits General Electric with coining the term
(see also Anthony, 1975, p. 63).
The analogous result in a finite-time setting is found by Edwards and Bell (1961): in Appendix B of their
book on business income, the authors use the fundamental equation eq. (1) and define the excess realizable
profit as piet=wt + at − (1 + i)wt−1, where the capital wt is valued on the basis of replacement cost. The
authors compute the present value of the stream of excess realizable profits
∑n
t=1
wt+at−(1+i)wt−1
(1+i)t , and
after simple algebraic manipulations they show that such a present value equals the NPV of the expected
stream of receipts (‘subjective goodwill’ in the authors’ words): N0 = v0 − a0 =
∑n
t=1 at(1 + i)
−t − a0 =∑n
t=1 pi
e
t (1 + i)
−t (see also Lu¨cke, 1955). Analogously, Bodenhorn (1964) defines residual income as pure
earnings and shows that the sum of their present values is equal to the sum of the present values of the net
cash flows (p. 27, footnote 19). In addition, he acknowledges that the equivalence “is independent of the
depreciation pattern” (p. 29); that is, the equivalence is independent of the sequence {wt} of outstanding
capitals.
Notwithstanding these various scattered contributions, only in recent years a full disclosure of the
relations among income, present value, accounting value, rate of return and excess profit has been ac-
complished and extensive use of residual income has been made in both academic fields and real-life
applications. In particular, in accounting, Peasnell (1981, 1982a) thoroughly investigates the relations
between accounting numbers and market values; in financial mathematics, Peccati (1987, 1989) decom-
poses the NPV of a project in period margins and provides an inner decomposition of piet in terms of
sources of funds raised to finance the project.
3.2 Peasnell and Peccati
Suppose a firm is incorporated to undertake an n-period project, which costs a0>0 and pays off periodic
cash flows at∈R, t = 1, 2, . . . , n. The cash-flow stream for the capital providers may be written in vectorial
form as ~a = (−a0, a1, a2, . . . , an). The project’s (firm’s) net present value is N0=
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)at−a0, where
~ı:=(i1, i2, . . . , it)∈ Rt, t = 1, 2, . . . , n, is the vector of period costs of capital, and ϕt(~ı):=[
∏t
k=1(1 + ik)]
−1
is the corresponding discount factor; by definition, ϕ0(~ı):=1.
Peasnell (1981, 1982a) assumes that the capital wt is the accounting book value of the firm’s assets bt,
and that the fundamental eq. (1) (known in accounting as clean surplus relation) holds for all periods. As
for time n, the author distinguishes cash flow from operations from project’s scrap value. Let Rn be the
scrap value and an∗ be cash flow from operations, with n∗ denoting time n after distribution of an∗ but
before distribution of Rn. The comprehensive last cash flow is such that an=an∗+Rn. The clean surplus
relation is assumed to hold for all t=1, 2, . . . , n∗ so that, in particular, an∗=pin + bn−1 − bn∗ . From these
assumptions, Peasnell shows that the firm’s NPV is equal to the discounted sum of accounting-based
excess profits plus the difference of discounted accounting error in capital valuation:
N0 =
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)at − a0 =
n−1∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)at + ϕn(~ı)(an∗ +Rn)− a0
=
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)pit +
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)bt−1 −
n−1∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)bt + ϕn(~ı)Rn − a0 − ϕn(~ı)bn∗
=
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)pit +
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)bt−1 −
n−1∑
t=0
ϕt(~ı)bt + ϕn(~ı)(Rn − bn∗)− (a0 − b0)
=
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)pit +
n∑
t=1
(ϕt(~ı)− ϕt−1(~ı))bt−1 + ϕn(~ı)(Rn − bn∗)− (a0 − b0).
Reminding that ϕt(~ı)−ϕt−1(~ı)=itϕt−1(~ı),
N0 =
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)pit −
n∑
t=1
itϕt(~ı)bt−1 + [ϕn(~ı)(Rn − bn∗)− (a0 − b0)]
=
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)(pit − itbt−1) + [ϕn(~ı)(Rn − bn∗)− (a0 − b0)]
(Peasnell, 1982a, p. 364). If, in addition, one assumes that the opening book capital is valued at outlay
(i.e. b0 = a0) and the closing book capital is written down to scrap value (i.e. b∗n = Rn), as it is usual in
capital budgeting, accounting valuation errors disappear6 and net present value is equal to the discounted
value of accounting-based excess profits:
N0 =
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)at − a0 =
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)(pit − itbt−1) (6)
(Peasnell, 1981, pp. 53-54). As already noted by Bodenhorn (1964), Peasnell himself notes that this
NPV-consistency (aka conservation property) is independent of the accounting system used for valuing
bt.
In financial mathematics, Peccati (1987, 1989, 1991) proposes a method of decomposing the NPV of a
project. To this end, he splits up the project in n one-period subprojects. Each of the subprojects starts
at time t−1 with capital invested wt−1 and terminates with end-of-period cash flow at plus terminal
value wt (see also Gronchi, 1984, and Manca, 1989, on the splitting up of cash-flow streams). Formally,
the cash-flow vector of each subproject is ~at = (~0t−2,−wt−1, wt + at,~0n−t), t = 1, 2, . . . , n, where ~0k
is the null vector in Rk. Note that
∑n
t=1 ~at = ~a, that is, the project is equivalent to a portfolio of n
one-period assets, where the opening capital of each asset equals the closing capital of the preceding one.
Peccati sets the following boundary conditions: w0=a0 (the capital invested in the first period is equal to
project A’s outlay) and wn=0 (the terminal capital, after the liquidating cash flow an has been paid to
the investor, is zero). The author rests on the fundamental equations (2)-(3) and highlights the univocal
correspondence between the outstanding capitals wt and the internal rates of return rt: once the values
for wt (respectively, rt) are arbitrarily chosen, the internal return rates rt (respectively, the outstanding
6A less stringent condition is that valuation errors offset each other: ϕn(~ı)[Rn − bn∗ ]=(a0 − b0).
capitals wt) are univocally determined. The net value of each asset is
N0(~at) = −ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1 + ϕt(~ı)(wt + at).
The net value of the portfolio is given by the sum of the values of the constituents assets, which coincides
with the project’s NPV:
n∑
t=1
N0(~at) =
n∑
t=1
−ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1 +
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)(wt + at) =
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~ı)at − a0 = N0(~a). (7)
Each asset’s net value N0(~at) is interpretable as the portion of project A’s NPV generated in the t-th
period. Using eq. (3), Peccati reshapes the periodic quota in a different form:
−ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1 + ϕt−1(~ı) (wt + at) = ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1(rt − it)
which expresses the spread between internal rate of return and cost of capital multiplied by the capital
invested in the t-th period. The final form of the decomposition becomes
N0 =
n∑
t=1
ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1(rt − it). (8)
Owing to the fundamental schema (1)-(3), the above expression becomes N0=
∑n
t=1 ϕt−1(~ı)(pit− i ·wt−1),
which resembles Peasnell’s eq. (6).
Assumptions. Peasnell’s and Peccati’s analyses are equivalent but rooted in different traditions.
The former author is concerned with accounting values and incomes, the latter is interested in finding
a general mathematical framework for decomposing a net present value in periodic quotas. Peasnell
makes use of assumptions on the accounting of the project to reach a perfect decomposition of NPV
with residual incomes: (i) the clean surplus relation holds and (ii) no accounting valuation errors arise;
Peccati does not rest on any particular assumption: he only rests on the standard notion of internal
rate of return (of which eq. (2) is a particular case) and the two boundary conditions w0=a0 and wn=0
for the resulting dynamic system represented by eq. (3). These conditions are financially natural : as a
financial mathematician, Peccati (1991, p. 25) exploits the metaphor “project=loan”, so that wt may be
interpreted as the residual debt the firm owes the investors (see footnote 2). The residual debt follows
the recursive eq. (3) and the boundary conditions are then obvious: w0=a0 says that the residual debt
at time 0 is equal to the amount borrowed by the firm from the investors, and wn=0 is just the usual
closing condition of an amortization plan: after the last “installment” an has been paid, borrowing and
lending sides have no pending amounts left (this assumption is taken by Samuelson, 1964, as well, in his
eq. (1’), p. 604). Peasnell’s approach does comply with the terminal condition wn=0 as well, though in
an implicit way: as seen, the author does apply the fundamental equation (1) at time n, but prior to the
distribution of Rn; however, after distribution of Rn, the terminal capital invested is necessarily zero:
bn = bn∗ −Rn=0.
Internal Financial Law. The role of one-period IRRs in Peccati’s analysis is of paramount impor-
tance and economically significant. In particular, Peccati uses the notion of Internal Financial Law (IFL),
which was previously introduced by Weingartner (1966) as a generalization of the IRR (with the label
internal return vector).7 Letting ~r:=(r1, r2, . . . rt)∈ Rt, t = 1, 2, . . . , n, the IFL determines a discount
function ϕt(~r):=[
∏t
k=1(1 + rk)]
−1 which is solution to the following equation:
−a0 +
n∑
t=1
ϕt(~r)at = 0. (9)
It is worth noting that the above relation is mathematically deduced from iteration of eq. (3) alongside
the equalities w0=a0 and wn=0. This implies that the notion of IFL is just a logical consequence of the
definition of income and the natural boundary conditions; this makes the notion of IFL economically
meaningful. If accounting income is assumed (so that wt=bt), then the resulting IFL turns out to be the
sequence of accounting rates. This sequence has been extensively studied in accounting. For example,
Kay (1976), focussing on a continuous setting, shows that “Every sequence of accounting rates of return
defines a valuation function under which the present value of the cash flows of the project is zero” (p. 90).
This result is found again in Peasnell (1982a, p. 367) for discrete-time projects (see also Peasnell, 1982b;
Franks and Hodges, 1984; Brief and Lawson, 1992; Brief, 1999; Feenstra and Wang, 2000). If rt=r for
all t, then the IFL collapses into the IRR and the latter may be written as a weighted average: replacing
each it with the internal rate r in eq. (8) one gets N0=
∑n
t=1 wt−1(rt − r)(1 + r)−t = 0 by definition of
IRR, whence
r =
∑n
t=1 rt · wt−1(1 + r)−t∑n
t=1 wt−1(1 + r)−t
(10)
(Peasnell, 1982a, Theorem 3; Franks and Hodges, 1984, p. 131; Brief, 1999, p. 3). However, the result
suffers from circularity. Peccati (1989, 1991) does not assume existence of IRR and uses the definition
of mean given by Chisini8 to find the project’s average yield: he replaces each rt with a constant r∗ and
imposes equal NPVs:
∑n
t=1 wt−1(rt − it)ϕt(~ı)=
∑n
t=1 wt−1(r
∗ − it)ϕt(~ı), whence
r∗ =
∑n
t=1 rt · ϕt(~ı)wt−1∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)wt−1
(11)
which differs, in general, from the IRR (if it exists). As a particular case, picking it=rt one finds
r∗ =
∑n
t=1 rt · ϕt(~r)wt−1∑n
t=1 ϕt(~r)wt−1
(12)
which, contrary to eq. (10), is not circular. It is worth noting that the sequence {wt} is univocally
determined by the sequence {rt}, not by the internal rate r, and that eq. (12) does not even depend
on costs of capital, but only on one-period rates. Generalizing, Peccati finds the average yield of a
portfolio of N projects, so that the average return rate of the portfolio is r∗ =
∑N
j=1
∑n
t=1 rtj ·ϕt(~ı)wt−1,j∑N
j=1
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)wt−1,j
(Peccati, 1989, p. 164; 1991, p. 53), where rtj is the one-period rate of the j-th project and wt−1,j is the
corresponding capital invested. With a similar argument, considering a portfolio of projects undertaken
in different countries, Peccati (1998) shows that the spreads between the IRR of each investment and the
opportunity cost of capital (adjusted to take account of the currencies) may be replaced by an average
spread which is the harmonic mean of the various spreads with weights the projects’ NPVs.
7See Gronchi (1984) and References therein, for an exhaustive historical survey and a thorough theoretical analysis of
the notion of internal rate of return.
8A function f of n variables xi leads to a Chisini mean if and only if there exists a unique M such that
f(M,M, ...,M)=f(x1, x2, ..., xn) (Chisini, 1929. See also de Finetti, 2008).
Given that the IFL is derived from recurrence equation (3), any sequence of IFL is such that the
resulting one-period rate rt has a genuine financial meaning: it represents the rate of capital increase or,
using the project=loan metaphor, it is the interest rate on the residual debt. Surprisingly, accounting
scholars often grant the IRR a privileged status as opposed to the sequence of accounting rates of return:
“it is difficult to assign economic significance to accounting yield except . . . as surrogate measures of
IRR” (Peasnell, 1982a, p. 380. But see Brief and Lawson, 1992, about the prominent role of accounting
rates for valuation). However, to use the IRR boils down to assuming a constant rate of capital increase
(constant interest rate on the “loan”). This may be the case when the investment is indeed a loan contract
with constant interest rate, or when it is a fixed-income security. In general, the profitability of most
projects is not uniformly distributed in time and “the classical troublesome problem of non existence or
of multiplicity of IRR arises from the basic and historical error consisting in the aim to describe through
a unique parameter what happens in quite different time periods” (Peccati, 1989, p. 158). Thus, to
introduce the IFL as a generalization of the notion of IRR “is not a deficiency of the approach. It simply
gives some degrees of freedom in the choice of parameters” (Peccati, 1989, p. 159). And if an aggregate
measure of profitability is required, the rates in eqs. (11)-(12) may be employed.
The standard RI approach is generalized by Peccati (1989, 1991), who decomposes the RI itself into
equity component and debt component. The line of reasoning is similar to the unlevered case: the author
ideally splits up the financing in n one-period sub-financings, so that each sub-project is financed by
a sub-financing. Denoting with dt the installment at time t, the author uses again the fundamental
equations (2)-(3) for the financing, so that Dt + dt=Dt−1(1 + δ) is the total payment at time t which
extinguishes the t-th sub-financing and δt = (Dt + dt − Dt−1)/Dt−1 is the corresponding contractual
rate. With respect to the unlevered case, the one-period project’s NPV is affected by the amount
Dt−1(δt− it), which is the opportunity cost of financing with debt rather than with equity: δtDt−1 is the
factual interest charge to be paid to debtholders, whereas itDt−1 is the counterfactual interest charge
that would be required if the same amount were borrowed from equityholders. The additional element
may be either positive or negative, depending on the sign of (δt − it). The residual income thus becomes
piet = wt−1(rt − it)−Dt−1(δt − it). Upon manipulating,
piet =
equity component︷ ︸︸ ︷
(wt−1 −Dt−1)(rt − it) +
debt component︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dt−1(rt − δt) . (13)
The first addend is the excess profit generated by equity, the second addend is the excess profit contributed
by debt. By using the usual fundamental equation for both the project and the debt, it is easy to show
that
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)pi
e
t = N0. Peccati’s twofold decomposition lends itself to useful analyses and applications
in business, industry, insurance and financial markets (Luciano, 1989; Peccati, 1991; Marena, 1991a,b;
Uberti, 1993; Gallo and Peccati, 1993; Magni, 1993; Camillo and Marena, 1994).9
9It is worth noting that Peccati’s analysis does not assume the existence of a Modigliani-Miller world, so that the
opportunity cost of capital is subjectively determined and no arbitrage theory is invoked to determine the relation between
levered and unlevered project. For this reason, the opportunity cost of capital is invariant under changes in the leverage
ratio. In Peccati’s analysis, uncertainty is managed either by simulation analysis (Gallo and Peccati, 1993) or by rigorous
application of probability theory (Marena, 1991b; Beccacece and Li Calzi, 1991; Luciano and Peccati, 1993).
3.3 The set and its elements
The above described theoretical framework may be actually seen as a basket where many infinite metrics
may be fleshed out depending on a particular notion of income and capital. The set of all possible metrics
is
Ψ =
{
piet ∈ R such that piet (~r, it) = pit(~r)− pit(~r, it)
}
(14)
where pit(~r) = rtwt−1(~r) is the factual profit, pit(~r, it) = itwt−1(~r) is the counterfactual profit, with
wt(~r):=wt(r1, . . . , rt). Since the early 1990s, this set is increasingly exploited by professionals and con-
sulting groups to devise appropriate measures of value creation. The Economic Value Added (Stewart,
1991), an accounting-based RI, is popularized by Stern Stewart & Co. and its proponents underline
that this measure is helpful for asset valuation, financial analysis, periodic performance assessment and
executive compensation. As for the latter, a common compensation plan is based on a bonus bank system
which makes the bonus earned by the manager equal to the sum of a target bonus plus a fixed percentage
of excess EVA improvement. Such a bonus is credited to a bonus “bank” and the balance of the bonus
bank determines the bonus paid (Martin and Petty, 2000; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin, Petty and
Rich, 2003). Beside EVA, a multitude of metrics have been put forward in the last twenty years (Stewart,
1991), among which the Oil&Gas Adjusted EVA purported by McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998);
the so-called Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model, (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995); the residual income
based on the cash flow return on investment (Madden, 1999); Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder
Value (see also Fabozzi and Grant, 2000).
4 Valuation, decision, and management
Valuation. The theoretical equivalence of the RI-based metrics and the NPV (the above mentioned
conservation property), is well-established and often reproposed in the literature (Martin and Petty,
2000; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Ferna´ndez, 2002; Martin, Petty, and Rich, 2003; Ve´lez-Pareja and
Tham, 2003), and it has been shown to be valid for portfolio of projects as well (Peccati, 1991; see also
Reichelstein, 1997). However, the implementation of the RI-based metrics in real-life applications often
result in valuations not consistent with the cash-flow-based approach. In their paper, Lundholm and
O’Keefe (2001) show that deceptively simple errors may be committed in the practical implementation
of the RI models, which result in different value estimates from the cash-flow based models. Lundholm
and O’Keefe unmask some subtle internal inconsistencies that often bias real-life applications. Their
paper may be considered as an informed guide to avoid three relevant mistakes: (a) inconsistent forecast
errors: this error occurs when the starting value from the terminal value perpetuity is incorrect, (b)
inconsistent discount rate error: this error occurs when the cost of equity as derived from the equity-
cash-flow model differs from the cost of equity implied in the weighted average cost of capital, for example
because book values or target values are used instead of market values (see also Ferna´ndez, 2002; Cigola
and Peccati, 2005), (c) missing cash flows error: this may arise, for example, when the income schema
in eq. (1) is not complied with by the financial statement forecasts. Important theoretical advances have
been made by O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002), who provide splitting identities to distinguish realization
of value and generation of value through the notion of unrecovered capital.10 Ohlson (1989, 1995) shows
that, under assumption of a determined stochastic process for excess profit, total incomes multiplied
by an appropriate discount factor approach market value in the long run, which reflects what Penman
calls the “aggregation property of accounting” (Penman, 1992, p. 237). The use of variation of RI and
its relations to value is the focus of O’Byrne’s (1996, 1997) investigations, who introduces the notion
of excess of EVA improvement (change in EVA minus expected change in EVA), based on Miller and
Modigliani’s (1961) investment opportunities approach. This very notion, relabelled Abnormal Earnings
Growth, is later reproposed and studied by Ohlson (2005) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) (an
early anticipation of the concept can be found in Bodenhorn, 1959).
RI maximization and NPV maximization. Given the conservation property of residual income,
NPV maximization is equivalent to residual income maximization over the entire life of the project. Pfeif-
fer (2000) shows that investment decisions with cash-flow-based performance measures are not consistent
with NPV maximization (see also Baldenius and Reichelstein, 2005) and Pfeiffer (2004) shows that the
class of all NPV-consistent criteria generated by accounting measures and independent of the choice of
capital wt coincide with the set Ψ (up to a linear transformation).11 Anctil (1996) and Anctil, Jordan and
Mukherji (1998a) deal with the case where investment decisions are delegated from the principal (equity’s
owner) to the agent (manager). While in general RI maximization in a period is not equivalent to NPV
maximization, the authors find appropriate assumptions under which even if the manager myopically
maximizes residual income ignoring both future residual incomes and future cash flows, the resulting
policy will lead, asymptotically, to NPV maximization: the sequence of investment decisions made by
manager has the same limit as the NPV-maximizing sequence. This result is particularly important in
those cases where the decentralization of cost and benefit information renders the NPV maximization
problem unsolvable and evidences that the NPV maximization may be replaced by RI maximization as a
useful simplification of the decision process (see previous related results by Tomkins, 1975; Emmanuel and
Otley, 1976; Scapens, 1978, 1979). Anctil, Jordan and Mukherji (1998b) also show that an activity-based
cost system support RI maximization. Most recently, a discussion in the literature concerns capacity
investments: capacity investments maximizing residual income are not optimal according to the NPV
rule; however, it may be shown that an appropriate choice can be found for the allocation rule which
leads to a situation in which the average historical cost is equal to the long run marginal cost under
the assumption of overlapping investments;12 therefore, capacity investments which maximize residual
income of a specific period are exactly those that maximize net present value. If this allocation rule is
used, the joined costs of these investments are linearly separable over time, which leads to the above
mentioned result (see Rajan and Reichelstein, 2008; Rogerson, 2008).
Investment decisions. Since Solomons’s (1965) classical book, the notion of residual income has
10Schueler (2000) and Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000) label it “invested capital”, given that it is equal to the difference
between market value and NPV (see Schueler, 2001, eq.(1); Magni, 2007a, Proposition 3). Ve´lez-Pareja (2001) use the label
“Initial investment not recovered” for the same notion. Young and O’Byrne’s (2001) Adjusted Invested Capital turns out
to be an equivalent notion, if income=cash flows is assumed (see Magni, 2007a).
11Focussing on one-period investments, Magni (2007d, 2008b) shows that the use of the CAPM for computing the cost
of capital makes RI and NPV nonequivalent (see also Magni, 2009, on the use of CAPM and NPV for capital budgeting).
12An allocation rule is a one-one correspondence with the outstanding capital wt and with the IFL. Letting β denote an
allocation rule, βt=(wt−1(~r)− wt(~r) + itwt−1(~r))/a0, so that RI in Ψ is written as piet = at − βta0.
been often advocated; in the 1970s a lively debate took place in management accounting in favour or
against the use of residual income for divisional and managerial performance measurement (Flower, 1971;
Bromwich 1973; Tomkins, 1975; Amey, 1975; Emmanuel and Otley, 1976). The notion of value-based
management (VBM) gradually arose to refer to a managerial approach based on the assumption that the
primary purpose is the long-term shareholders’ wealth maximization (Arnold and Davies, 2000; Young
and O’Byrne, 2001). In a certain sense, VBM is just “net present value analysis or internal rate return
analysis ... writ large and applied to strategies, business units, product lines, and so on” (Arnold, 2000,
p. 21). Despite conservation property, which holds irrespective of the choice of the sequence {wt}, the
sign of residual incomes differs, in general, from the the sign of the NPV (Flower, 1971; Bromwich,
1973; Bromwich and Walker, 1998; Drukarczyk and Schueler, 2000; Martin, Petty and Rich, 2003). That
is, strong goal congruence is not preserved. In this context, a proliferation of recent contributions deal
with construction of strong goal congruent measures. Particularly significant is Rogerson’s (1997) paper,
which copes with investment decisions in decentralized organizations: the principal delegates decisions
on investment level to the agent who is better informed about the investment opportunities. The agent
is assumed to be “impatient”: he has a shorter time horizon and/or uses a higher discount rate than
the principal. The principal aims at maximizing the expected NPV and the agent aims at maximizing
a utility function which depends on RI via a reward contract that linearly links RI to wages. Assuming
positive operating cash flows governed by a specified stochastic path, of which only the distributional
parameters are known to the principal, the author shows that there is a unique allocation rule (and thus a
unique sequence of {wt}), called the “Relative Marginal Benefit” rule, which is optimal in the sense that it
maximizes both the principal’s expected NPV and the manager’s utility function. Thus, the author finds
the only RI metric that, under convenient assumptions, guarantees strong goal congruence and constitutes
an effective incentive for manager’s optimal behavior. It is worth noting that Rogerson’s metric is exactly
equal to Grinyer’s (1985, 1987, 1995) Earned Economic Income. Reichelstein (1997) shows that the RI
in combination with Relative Marginal Benefit allocation rule is the unique linear performance metric
that achieves strong goal congruence in this context (see also Bromwich and Walker, 1998). Under the
same information structure of Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997), Mohnen (2003) and Mohnen
and Bareket (2007) show that the Relative Marginal Benefit allocation rule is not optimal if exogenous
capital constraints (or mutually exclusive projects) are introduced in the decision problem. Without
capital constraints, the equity owners’ aim is to undertake all projects with an expected positive NPV; if
capital constrains are present, the goal is to undertake the highest-NPV portfolio of projects satisfying the
constraint, a property which is named perfect goal congruence (Mohnen, 2003) or robust goal congruence
(Dutta and Reichelstein, 2005) and is achieved if the residual-income measure is a (positive) multiple of
the NPV, where the proportionality constant is independent of the project (e.g. Mohnen, 2003, Lemma
1; Mohnen and Bareket, 2007, Lemma 1; Pfeiffer and Velthius, 2008, Corollary 17).13 If the manager
is impatient he will tend to undertake, among positive NPV projects, the one which has the quickest
(expected) return. Mohnen and Bareket (2007) consider a performance measure of the form αtat − βta0
and show how αt and βt must be chosen so as to induce the agent to optimally select a portfolio of
13The problem of finding a goal congruent measure may be interpreted in Peccati’s terms as the search for a decomposition
of the project’s NPV such that the period margin is a multiple of the NPV itself.
projects, whereby the NPV is maximized and robust goal congruence is achieved.14 Baldenius, Dutta,
and Reichelstein (2006) deal with the case of optimal project selection in presence of several divisional
managers; Grinyer and Walker (1990) and Stark (2000) focus on real-option frameworks and find that
a residual income-type performance measure can be designed which supports optimal investment and
disinvestment decisions (see also Friedl, 2005). Schultze and Weiler (2008) deal with a context where the
manager communicates the principal the future value of the project. The authors introduce the notion of
Residual Economic Income,15 based on O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) Excess Value Created, to design
a bonus bank system according to which the manager is rewarded on the basis of both past realized
value and value generated by future residual incomes. Their system induces optimal investment even if
the impatient manager leaves the firm before completion of the project, provided an internal market is
created where the quitting manager sells the bonus bank to the entering manager: they show that if the
purchase price for the bonus bank is computed with the Nash (1950) bargaining solution, the quitting
manager will choose the optimal investment level and will have no incentive to overstate value creation
in his reporting.
Operations management. While the focus on investment decisions is predominant in the literature,
recent contributions have dealt with several different kinds of decisions. As regards operations manage-
ment, a significant contribution is Baldenius and Reichelstein (2005), where the authors examine efficient
inventory management from an incentive and control perspective: the firm delegates decision-making to
a manager who has superior information and affects sales revenues with his productive efforts. They
propose to value inventory with a compounded historical cost valuation rule that capitalizes production
costs and periodic holding costs and, in addition, treats inventory as an interest-accruing asset (i.e. the
value of each unit remaining in ending inventory in a given period increases at the cost of capital i).
The authors assume: (i) the manager’s objective is to maximize the (expected) NPV of bonus payments,
which are proportional to RI, (ii) the optimal sales exceed the available production capacity in each
period of the inventory cycle, (iii) the LIFO (last-in-first-out) inventory flow valuation rule is employed.
This implies wt=
[
c(1 + i)t−t
∗
+
∑t−t∗
k=0 (1 + i)
k
]
xt, with c=unit production cost, xt=ending inventory,
t∗= beginning of inventory buildup. The authors show that the optimal production and sales plan that
maximizes the firm’s NPV is also the one that maximizes the NPV of manager’s bonus payments. In
case the manager receives updated information about future revenues after the initial production decision
the residual income based on the lower-of-cost-or-market rule becomes the optimal incentive mechanism
(see also Dutta and Zhang, 2002, on production incentives). A goal congruence approach is also followed
by Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) which analyze several different transactions: multi-year construction
contracts, long-term leases, asset disposals, research and development (see also Pfeiffer and Schneider,
2007). Stoughton and Zechner (2007) consider capital allocation based on RI in financial institutions
(e.g. banks) assuming frictions in the markets and focussing on an institution composed of a risky and a
riskless division.16
14The importance of this strand of literature for practical applications is indirectly evidenced by Balachandran (2006),
which provides support that “RI affects real management actions, a necessary condition for assessing the optimality of those
actions” (p. 393).
15See the analogous notion of Net Value Created in Schueler and Krotter (2008).
16The reader may also benefit from the overview in Schultze and Weiler (2008) on these topics.
Portfolio management. Residual income structure may also be used for portfolio optimization. In
a portfolio, it is essential to rest on reliable estimates of return parameters. The use of RI for extracting
implied expected returns from analysts’ forecasts is recent: Frankel and Lee (1998) use a three-period
version of the RI model based on analysts’ forecasts to estimate an intrinsic value measure for firms
(see also Lee, 1999). Claus and Thomas (2001) use the approach for forecasting the equity premium,
a fundamental variable in portfolio management because it is a component of the cost of capital. The
authors argue that the use of RI is superior compared to the dividend growth model and estimate the
equity premium for six countries, whose robustness is corroborated by sensitivity analyses. Hagemeister
and Kempf (2007) use expected returns (rather than the usual realized returns) implicit in the RI model
to test different versions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. In another context, Hagemeister and Kempf
(2006) use the expected returns implied by the RI model for Markowitz-optimization. They optimally
combine the RI-based estimator with the time series estimator using the Bayesian approach and find
that such a combination results in a better performance when compared to traditional estimation and
investment strategies (see also Daske, Gebhardt, and Klein, 2006). Barniv and Myring (2006) contrast
two empirical models for assessing the explanatory power for security prices in seventeen countries. The
historical model makes price depend on historical book value and earnings, the forecast model makes
price depend on ex ante analysts’ forecasts of book value and residual income. The authors find that the
explanatory power of the forecast model is greater in the Anglo-Saxon and North American countries,
as well as in Germany, Japan and three Nordic countries, whereas it is equivalent in Latin countries and
in Switzerland. Desroisiers, Lemaire, and L’Her (2007) use RI to deduce the implicit expected rates of
return of nineteen countries, claiming that the RI model is “the more reliable and consistent measure
of implicit expected rates of returns among countries” (p. 78). They consider zero-investment portfolios
and implement a ranking strategy and a mean-variance optimization strategy, finding that the strategies
posted positive performances.
5 The lost-capital paradigm
A new alternative concept of residual income, consistent with the fundamental eqs. (1)-(3) has been
proposed in recent years. Originally introduced with the name Systemic Value Added (Magni, 2000a,b,c)
it has been developed, generalized and thoroughly investigated from several points of view: mathematical,
theoretical, cognitive, empirical (Magni, 2001a,b; 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008a). The paradigm has been
used to conjoin into a unified perspective disparate models and notions in economic theory and corporate
finance (Magni, 2007a,b,c). The theory is essentially based on the idea that the undoing of the factual
scenario should be accomplished in a genuinely counterfactual way: if the investors had invested in the
alternative course of action, the capital that the investor would have owned is different from wt(~r), so
the counterfactual income is not equal to itwt−1(~r). In the counterfactual scenario, capital would have
increased periodically at the rate i, so that the acceptance of the project implies that a capital equal
to wt(~ı):=wt(i1, i2, . . . it) is lost by the investors: for this reason, the systemic-value-added theory may
also be named the lost capital theory (Magni, 2007a,b). In value-based management, Drukarczyk and
Schueler (2000) and Schueler and Krotter (2004) endorse the use of Net Economic Income, which is a
market-based lost-capital residual income, while Young and O’Byrne (2001)’s notion of Adjusted EVA
turns out to be an accounting-based lost-capital residual income in the case where earnings=dividends
(see Magni, 2007a).
5.1 The Systemic Value Added
Magni originally introduces the Systemic Value Added by using the following argument. Let W0∈R be
the investor’s wealth at time 0 and assume it is currently invested in a financial asset F whose periodic
interest rate is it. Suppose the investor has the opportunity of investing a0 in project A. The investor
may choose to (i) withdraw a0 from asset F and invest it in the project or, alternatively, (ii) leave wealth
invested in asset F . The two alternatives unfold two different financial scenarios for the investor’s wealth:
(i) Factual scenario. The project is accepted. Then, the investor’s wealth is a portfolio of project A and
asset F . Let Ft be the value of asset F and wt be the balance of project A; assuming each cash flow at
released by A is reinvested in F , one has Ft=Ft−1(1+it)+at and wt(~r)=wt−1(~r)(1+rt)−at, t = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where the sequence {wt} is arbitrary except for the boundary conditions w0(~r)=a0 and wn(~r)=0. The
investor’s wealth at time t is a simple dynamic system recursively computed as Wt=Ft−1(1 + it) +
wt−1(~r)(1 + rt)=Wt−1 + itFt−1 + rtwt−1(~r). The (factual) profit is Wt −Wt−1=itFt−1 + rtwt−1(~r).17
(ii) Counterfactual scenario. The project is rejected. Then, the investor’s wealth equals the value of asset
F , which grows at a rate it. Let F t and W t be, respectively, the values of the asset and the investor’s
wealth, which is now governed by a dynamic system expressed by W t=F t=F t−1(1 + it). Hence, the
(counterfactual) profit is W t −W t−1=itW t−1.
Contrasting the two profits in the two scenarios a new definition of residual income is generated:
Πet =
(
itFt−1 + rtwt−1(~r)
)− itF t−1 (15)
(Magni, 2000a, p. 164; 2000b, p. 54; 2001a, eq. (11a); 2004, p. 601) where the foregone return on wealth
itF
t−1 has the meaning of opportunity cost. Such an excess profit is labelled Systemic Value Added (SVA)
because the evolution of wealth in the two scenarios is represented by two different dynamic systems.
The assumption of reinvestment of at at the cost of capital it may be relaxed by dismissing investor’s
wealth and reframing the two scenarios: in the factual scenario the investor invests the amount a0 in
project A so that the project balance is wt(~r)=wt−1(~r)(1+rt)−at (with the usual boundary conditions).
In the counterfactual scenario the investor invests a0 in a financial asset whose interest rate is it and
periodically withdraws the amount at from the asset. The asset balance is wt(~ı)=wt−1(~ı)(1 + it) − at,
with obvious initial condition w0(~ı)=a0. At the beginning of each period, the investor invests capital
wt−1(~r) at the rate rt but so doing she loses the opportunity of investing wt−1(~ı) at the rate it. The
capital wt−1(~ı) is thus the capital lost by the investor, the sum that would have been invested if the
counterfactual scenario had been chosen. The investor receives a return of rtwt−1(~r) from A, so losing
the opportunity of earning itwt−1(~ı). The latter is the profit foregone, lost by the investor (Magni, 2005,
17Obviously, such a profit is consistent with the fundamental equations (1)-(2) once the meaning of the variables is made
clear: the capital is the investor’s entire wealth Wt (inclusive of the project and the financial asset), the rate of return is
itFt−1+rtwt−1
Ft−1+wt−1
, a weighted average of rt and it, and net cash flow is zero (cash flows are withdrawn from the project and
reinvested in the financial asset).
p. 67). The difference between the two alternative profits may be named the lost-capital residual income,
which actually is nothing but the SVA, because F t − Ft=wt(~ı), with w0(~ı)=a0=F 0 − F0. Therefore,
Πet = rtwt−1(~r)− itwt−1(~ı). (16)
Reminding that the standard residual income is such that piet (~r, it)=pit(~r)−pit(~r, it), the lost-capital
paradigm is obtained by replacing pit(~r, it) with pit(~ı). That is, Πet=pit(~r)−pit(~ı).18 The sequence {Πet}
decomposes the Net Final Value Nn. To see it, just consider that the fundamental equations for the two
scenarios may be rewritten as rtwt−1(~r) = wt(~r) − wt−1(~r) + at and itwt−1(~ı) = wt(~ı) − wt−1(~ı) + at,
respectively. Hence,
Πet =
(
wt−1(~ı)− wt(~ı)
)− (wt−1(~r)− wt(~r)). (17)
Given that w0(~r)=w0(~ı) and wn(~r)=0, and solving wt(~ı)=wt−1(~ı)(1 + it)− at for t=n,
n∑
t=1
Πet =
n∑
t=1
[(
wt−1(~ı)− wt(~ı)
)− (wt−1(~r)− wt(~r))] (18)
= wn(~r)− w0(~r)−
(
wn(~ı)− w0(~ı)
)
= −wn(~ı) = N0
n∏
t=1
(1 + it) = Nn. (19)
Equation (19) shows that the sequence {Πet} decomposes the Net Final Value, and that such a decom-
position is independent of the sequence {wt(~r)} selected: it only depends on the boundary conditions
w0(·)=0 and wn(~r)=0. As a result, the sequence {ϕn(~ı) ·Πet} decomposes the NPV:
N0 = ϕn(~ı)
(
Πe1 + Π
e
2 + . . .+ Π
e
n
)
= ϕn(~ı)Πe1 + ϕn(~ı)Π
e
2 + . . .+ ϕn(~ı)Π
e
n (20)
as opposed to the sequence {ϕt(~ı) · piet } in the standard paradigm:
N0 = ϕ1(~ı)pie1 + ϕ2(~ı)pi
e
2 + . . .+ ϕn(~ı)pi
e
n. (21)
Hence, v0=a0+ϕn(~ı)
∑n
t=1 Π
e
t as opposed to v0=a0+
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)pi
e
t (e.g. Magni, 2000a; 2001a,b; 2003;
2005). The lost-capital decomposition then induces a Sum&Discount method as opposed to the standard
Discount&Sum method. Penman’s (1992) words, referred to earnings, perfectly fit here, as referred to
lost-capital abnormal earnings: “Unlike dividends (or cash flows), [abnormal] earnings aggregate in a value
sense. One does not have to worry about timing. The task does not involve predicting [abnormal] earnings
next year, the following year, and so on, but the total dollar [abnormal] earnings that a firm will deliver to
the horizon” (p. 237). This brings about relevant implications regarding errors in forecast for investments
under uncertainty. Suppose the vectors of theoretically correct residual incomes are (pˆie1, pˆi
e
2 . . . , pˆi
e
n) and
(Πˆe1, Πˆ
e
2 . . . , Πˆ
e
n) in the standard and lost-capital paradigm respectively, and let (pi
e
x1, pi
e
x2 . . . , pi
e
xn) and
(Πex1,Π
e
x2 . . . ,Π
e
xn) be permutations of the correct vectors. Obviously, vˆ0=a0 + ϕn(~ı) ·
∑n
t=1 Πˆ
e
t = a0 +
18The latter enables one to link residual income to the derivative of the income function (rates assumed constant for
notational convenience):
Πe = pi(r)− pi(i) = pi′(i)(r − i) + o(|r − i|), r → i.
ϕn(~ı) ·
∑n
t=1 Π
e
xt = v0, where vˆ0 and v0 are, respectively, the theoretically correct and the forecasted
project value. Thus, errors in timing are neutralized. In contrast, in the standard paradigm one finds,
in general, that the forecasted value differs from the correct value if residual incomes are incorrectly
attributed to periods: vˆ0 = a0 +
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)pˆi
e
t 6= a0 +
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)pi
e
xt=v0 (see also Magni, 2007c). This
implies that the heuristic of the arithmetic mean (
∑n
t=1 Π
e
t)/n of expected residual incomes for forecasting
purposes is highly relevant in this context (see also Remark 1 below).
Remark 1. As previously seen, one must average the one-period rates with discounted capitals (see
eqs. (10)-(12)) to find the average yield (or the IRR) of the project; it is widely accepted in the literature
that the plain vanilla average of one-period rates weighted by the (undiscounted) outstanding capitals
wt is not meaningful (e.g. Kay, 1976, p. 91). In fact, the L paradigm enables one to give that plain
vanilla average a genuine meaning of profitability index: by imposing ϕn(~ı)
∑n
t=1(rtwt−1(~r)− itwt−1(~ı))=
ϕn(~ı)
∑n
t=1(r
∗
Lwt−1(~r)− itwt−1(~ı)), one finds the Chisini mean
r∗L =
∑n
t=1 rt · wt−1(~r)∑n
t=1 wt−1(~r)
. (22)
Therefore, the weighted average of one-period rates is unsatisfactory only if one looks at return rates with
the standard-theory eyes. Wearing the L “glasses” one is able to recognize r∗L as being a Chisini mean
return. While the existence of the IRR is not required for eq. (22) to hold, the IRR itself may be found
by replacing each it with the internal rate r in eq. (16) so that
∑n
t=1(rtwt−1(~r)− rwt−1(r)) = 0, whence
r =
∑n
t=1 rtwt−1(~r)∑n
t=1 wt−1(r)
(23)
where wt−1(r):=wt−1(r, r, . . . , r) is the IRR-based outstanding capital (not to be confused with the one-
period-rate-based capital wt−1(~r)=wt−1(r1, r2, . . . , rt−1). Note also that r 6= r∗L. Furthermore, with the
same Chisini-based argument one gets, from the equation
∑n
t=1(pit− itwt−1(~ı))=
∑n
t=1(pi− itwt−1(~ı)), the
average profit pi=(
∑n
t=1 pit)/n; and, from the equation
∑n
t=1 Π
e
t=
∑n
t=1 Π
e, the average residual income
Πe=(
∑n
t=1 Π
e
t)/n, which confirms the above mentioned implications for forecast purposes.
5.2 The arbitrage connection
An important feature of the lost-capital paradigm is that it may be naturally derived from an arbitrage
theory perspective. Suppose p is a portfolio traded in the market which replicates project A’s cash flows.
Let the yield term structure be represented by ϕt(~ı), which is an IFL representing the unit price of a
t-period zero-coupon bond issued at time 0. The value of p is p0 =
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)at = a0 + N0. If p0 6= a0
(i.e. N0 6=0) the investor may exploit arbitrage opportunities. For example, assuming (with no loss of
generality) p0 > a0, the investor may take a long position in A and a short position in p and reinvest
the arbitrage gain (p0 − a0) in portfolio p. The resulting net cash flow will be zero at each date, and the
investor will receive a net final cash flow Γ, such that Γ = (p0 − a0)
∏n
t=1(1 + it)=N0
∏n
t=1(1 + it) (see
Table 3). We aim at decomposing the terminal arbitrage gain Γ in period margins. To this end, note
that the long and short positions in p may be netted out to result in a net short position (see Table 4).
A short position in an asset is financially equivalent to a financing, so asset p may be viewed as a “debt”
whose (variable) rate of interest is it. The arbitrage strategy may thus be interpreted as an investment in
A wholly financed by asset p. The project’s cash flows are used to repay the debt, so the project balance
is wt(~r) = wt−1(~r)(1 + rt) − at, and the residual debt is wt(~ı) = wt−1(~ı)(1 + it) − at. At time n, the
balance of the debt is wn(~ı)=−N0
∏n
t=1(1+ it)=−Γ<0. The final wn(~ı) is negative because the total final
payment to close off the position on p (=an − Γ) is smaller than the amount received from the project
(=an).19 Therefore, rtwt−1(rt) is the return from the long position, while itwt−1 is interest on the short
position. The latter represents the cost of the arbitrage strategy. As a result, the periodic gain from the
arbitrage strategy is rtwt−1(~r)−itwt−1(~ı), but the latter is just the lost-capital residual income Πet above
introduced, so that
Γ = −wn(~ı) = N0
n∏
t=1
(1 + it) = Πe1 + Π
e
2 + . . .+ Π
e
n.
The arbitrage gain sequence {Πet} decomposes the grand total arbitrage gain Γ in period margins (see
also Magni, 2007b, section 3.1).
5.3 Relations between the two theories
The two theories lead, in general, to residual incomes which differ in terms of value and, possibly, in
terms of sign (see Ghiselli Ricci and Magni, 2006). However, they are formally related. Let L : pie → Πet
be the operator transforming standard RIs in lost-capital RIs: we have
piet → L(piet ) = piet − it(wt−1(~ı)− wt−1(~r)). (24)
L is a bijection, so the inverse function S = L−1 exists, transforming lost-capital excess profit into
standard excess profit:
Πet → S(Πet) = Πet + it(wt−1(~ı)− wt−1(~r)). (25)
(L=lost-capital, S=standard). The constant in the linear affine functions is a converting factor repre-
senting the lost (or earned if negative) interest on the surplus of capital the investor would own if she
rejected the project and invested his funds a0 in the alternative asset. As we have seen, performance in
the L paradigm is measured not only in terms of which interest rate could have been exploited by the
investor, but also in terms of which capital could have been exploited. Thus, while rt > it signals positive
performance in the classical S paradigm (because it implies piet > 0), the capital lost by the investor
may be greater than the actual capital invested (i.e wt−1(~ı) > wt−1(~r)), so that the L excess profit may
signal a smaller performance with respect to the S-paradigm: the interest that could have been yielded
by the surplus of capital may be so great as to offset the positive effect of the rate of return: whenever
0 < piet < it[wt−1(~ı) − wt−1(~r)], one gets Πet < 0 < piet , which informs that a negative performance is
measured by the L paradigm. The additional component may symmetrically act as a sort of insurance
bonus: if rt < it, performance may still be regarded as positive if wt−1(~ı) < wt−1(~r), which means that
past performance has been so positive that the factual capital is greater than the capital lost, so that the
smaller rate of return in the period is more than compensated by the greater basis wt−1(~r) to which it is
19Rigorously speaking, in analogy with the description of Peasnell’s approach, one should write wn∗=−Γ, and
wn(~ı)=wn∗ − (−Γ) = 0, because, after distribution of the arbitrage gain Γ, no pending positions are left.
applied. This may be rephrased in a rate-of-return comparison:
Πet > 0 if and only if rt > i
∗
t = it + it
wt−1(~ı)− wt−1(~r)
wt−1(~r)
. (26)
The second addend in the right-hand side is the product of the opportunity cost of capital and the
relative increase (decrease) in capital due to acceptance of the project. For example, suppose it=0.1,
wt−1(~r)=80, wt−1(~ı)=100; then, if project had been rejected, the counterfactual capital would be higher
than the the factual capital employed; in particular, it would be higher by a 25%=(100−80)/80. This
means that the investor could have invested a 25% more capital than she actually invests, and she could
have earned a 10% on that 25%, so that an additional 2.5% would accrue to her. Therefore, for a positive
performance to occur, the period internal rate must be greater than 10%; in particular, the threshold
level is i∗=12.5%=10%+2.5%. In general, the required cutoff rate i∗t may be greater, equal or smaller
than the cost of capital it. The latter case occurs whenever the additional-interest component is negative,
which means that the factual capital exceeds the counterfactual capital and therefore the investor foregoes
(not a return but) a cost. Under this perspective the L excess profit lends itself to a reinterpretation:
it may be seen as a S residual income where the opportunity cost of capital includes the (positive or
negative) additional interest on the surplus wt−1(~ı) − wt−1(~r) . Formally, Πet = pit(~r) − pit(~r, i∗) so that
Πet = wt−1(~r)(rt − i∗), where i∗ is a comprehensive (i.e. all-inclusive) opportunity cost of capital. Any
L residual income may therefore be dressed as a S residual income by using a comprehensive cost of
capital:20
piet = pit(~r)− pit(~r, i) = wt−1(~r)(rt − it) with conservation property N0 =
∑
ϕt(~ı)piet
Πet = pit(~r)− pit(~r, i∗) = wt−1(~r)(rt − i∗t ) with conservation property N0 = ϕn(~ı)
∑
Πet .
(27)
Remark 2. Pfeiffer (2004) shows that the class of accounting-based performance measures in Ψ is the
only one that satisfies conservation property for any sequence of {wt(~r)}. Eqs. (20) and (27) induce an
enlargement of that class if the following notion of residual income is introduced:
Definition 2. A real number ψt is said to be a residual income if, for any sequence {wt(~r)}∈ Rn−1, there
exists a sequence {jt}∈ Rn and a ξ> 0 such that ψt = wt−1(~r) · (rt − jt) and N0 =
∑n
t=1 ϕξ(~ı) · ψt.
Note that ψt=pit(~r)−pit(~r, jt), and the set Ψ is enlarged to encompass both the S paradigm (if jt = it
and ξ = t) and the L paradigm (if jt = i∗t and ξ = n).
Remark 3. Manipulating the fundamental eq. (1) for both the capital wt−1(~r) and the lost capital wt−1(~ı),
one finds two relations connecting the S paradigm to the L paradigm:
• in terms of standard RIs: we have wt−1(~r)− wt−1(~ı)=
∑t−1
k=1 pi
e
k
∏t−1
k=1(1 + ik), which implies
Πet − piet = it
t−1∑
k=1
piek
t−1∏
k=1
(1 + ik) (28)
20A further formal dressing is Πet=wt−1(~ı)(rt− it) with rt = rtwt−1(~r)/wt−1(~ı) where wt−1(~ı) may be interpreted as the
balance of a shadow project (see Magni, 2000a, 2003, 2004, 2005).
• in terms of lost-capital RIs: we have wt−1(~r)− wt−1(~ı)=
∑t−1
k=1 Π
e
k which implies
Πet − piet = it
t−1∑
k=1
Πek (29)
(see Magni, 2000a, eqs. (6)-(7); 2001b, eqs. (12) and (14); 2004, eqs. (13)-(14)).21 Owing to eqs. (28)
and (29), the L paradigm may be said to take account of the past performances. As seen above, if
management had invested the initial sum a0 in the counterfactual alternative, the capital invested in
each period would have been different. Positive performances in the past, resulting in positive residual
incomes, positively reverberate on the current residual income, whereas negative performances will have
a negative effect on future excess profit. Therefore, excess profits are chained one another: managers’
performance one year reverberates on the following year, so that positive (negative) past performances
magnify (shrink) current performances.
5.4 The forerunners: (a) Keynes
The notion of lost-capital residual income may be drawn from Keynes’s (1936) notion of user cost.
Referring to an entrepreneur, the author defines user cost counterfactually as the difference between “the
value of his capital equipment at the end of the period . . . and . . . the value it might have had at the
end of the period if he had refrained from using it” (Keynes, 1967, p. 66). Coase (1968) renames it
“depreciation through use”, stressing the fact that it represents a depreciation charge not with respect
to time, but to the use of the capital equipment. It reflects a depreciation due to “the choice between
. . . using a machine for a purpose and using it for another” (Coase, 1968, p. 123). Such a depreciation
represents the “opportunity cost of putting goods and resources to a certain use” (Scott, 1953, p. 369); it
is an economic measure of “the opportunity lost when another decision is carried through” (Scott, 1953,
p. 375, italics added). The capital equipment is used to undertake a project whose value is equal to “the
present value of the net receipts . . . by discounting them at a rate of interest” (Coase, 1968, p. 123) and
this “rate of discount coincides with that in the market” (Scott, 1953, p. 378). Keynes himself claims
that the user cost at a given time t is “the discounted value of the additional prospective yield which
would be obtained at some later date” (Keynes, 1967, p. 70). Magni (2007a, section 9) shows that user
cost may be formalized as wt(~ı) − vt. It is possible to consider its own depreciation through time by
focussing on the periodic variation of user cost:
depreciation through time of user cost =
(
wt−1(~ı)− vt−1
)− (wt(~ı)− vt).
The above expression is actually a particular case of eq. (17), where wt−1(~r):=vt−1, which implies that
the one-period rate rt is the market rate of return: rt:=it for t>1 (for t=1 the initial boundary condition
w0(~r)=a0 implies r1=(v1 − a0 + a1)/a0). As a result, Keynes’s analysis of user cost unfolds an implicit
market-based lost-capital residual income, which we here name Keynesian Excess Profit (KEP) and
rewrite in terms of differential profits:
KEP1 = r1a0 − i1a0, KEPt = itvt−1 − itwt−1(~ı) for t > 1 (30)
21Obviously, one also finds, from eq. (27), the relation Πet −piet=wt−1(~r)(it− i∗t ), which represents the difference between
two opportunity costs.
where, obviously, Nn=N0/ϕn(~ı)=
∑n
t=1 KEPt.
22 The user cost is thus a building brick of the L theory,
which discloses two important properties. In first place, it is usually thought that “economists cannot
afford to lump together, as ‘depreciation’, changes in present value caused by the passage of time, and by
use” (Scott, 1953, p. 371): on the contrary, a lost-capital approach on RI does enable one to lump together
depreciation through time and depreciation through use. In second place, the KEP satisfies (strong and)
robust goal congruence: we have KEP1 = v1 + a1 − a0 = N0/ϕ1(~ı) and KEPt = it(vt−1 −wt−1(~ı))=Nt −
Nt−1=itNt−1=itN0/ϕt(~ı) for t > 1 (see Magni, 2007a, sections 8-10).
5.5 The forerunners: (b) Pressacco and Stucchi
Pressacco and Stucchi (PS) (1997) focus on Peccati’s decomposition model and aim at generalizing the
standard theory by considering return rates depending on the sign of the project balance (see Teichroew,
Robichek and Montalbano, 1965a,b); however, in the final section of the paper, PS introduce the notion
of external financing (p. 181) as opposed to self-financing ; as may be easily checked, the former is equal
to the lost capital wt(~ı) and the latter is equal to the difference wt(~r) − wt(~ı). In the final remarks of
that section they hint at a period margin obtained as the sum of two components: the operating margin,
which is equal to the factual income rtwt−1(~r), and the interest on self-financing, which is equal to the
converting factor it[wt−1(~r)−wt−1(~ı)]. In such a way, the authors change their very approach to residual
income and construct a period margin by making use of the lost-capital approach.
Remark 4. O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) use the notion of unrecovered capital, which is equivalent to the
notion of PS’s external financing, and therefore equivalent to the lost capital (see also Table 5). In their
Proposition 1, they relate unrecovered capital, book value, and past residual incomes: using our symbols,
bt=wt(~ı)+
∑t
k=1 pi
e
k(1 + i)
t−k. It is worth noting that this result is formally anticipated in a general form
by PS’s (1997) Theorem 7.1 (Schueler, 2001, hints at the same result in his eqs. (2)-(3). See also Magni,
2007a; Schueler and Krotter, 2004, 2008, for relations between lost capital, capital invested, and NPV).
6 Constructing performance metrics
In this section we consider some RI models presented in the literature and in the practice, as well as
some natural extensions of them. The various models may be categorized on the basis of the notion of
(income and) capital employed and of the relevant cash flows considered for valuation. As for the notion
of capital, we consider three main categories: book value, market value, IRR-based capital. As for the
cash flows, we consider three perspectives: the entity approach, the claimholders’ approach, the equity
(or proprietary) approach. In an entity approach the relevant cash flows are the free cash flows (i.e. the
cash flow that equityholders would receive if the project were unlevered); in a claimholders’ approach the
capital cash flows (i.e. the cash flows to all claimholders) are used; in an equity approach the relevant
cash flows are the equity cash flows (i.e. dividends+share repurchases−new shares).23
22When, after more than sixty years, Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000) advocate the use of their Net Economic Income,
they unawarely compute the depreciation through time of Keynes’s user cost (see section 6 below).
23One should not confuse capital cash flows with free cash flows: the relation among the four types of cash flows may be
summarized by the equalities ct=et + dt=ft + τIt (see Ruback, 2002; Ferna´ndez, 2002; Tham and Ve´lez-Pareja, 2004).
Henceforth, it is assumed that the project is uncertain and that a MM market exist (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958, 1963). This implies that the cash flows at, the RIs and the costs of capital should be
interpreted as expected values.
Accounting-based RI models (Table 6). These models are characterized by the adoption of an
accounting notion of (income and) capital. Thus, the book value of capital is used, and the correspond-
ing one-period IRR is computed from the fundamental equation eq. (2). In an entity perspective, the
Economic Value Added (EVA) model is originated (Stewart, 1991), where the net operating profit after
taxes (nopat) is the relevant income and the free cash flows are the relevant cash flows, which implies that
the one-period IRR is the return on investment (roi). Correspondingly, the opportunity cost of capital
is the well-known weighted average cost of capital : ρt =
ρetv
e
t−1+ρ
D
t Dt−1(1−τ)
vet−1+Dt−1
. A modified version of the
EVA model is proposed by Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham (2004), who adopt a claimholders’ perspective and
suggest the use of the claimholders’ profit (net profit to shareholders+interest on debt) as the relevant
income. Such a profit is equal to the nopat plus the tax shield, and the ratio of this adjusted nopat
to the book value of assets is here named return on liabilities (rol). The cash flows considered are the
capital cash flows and the opportunity cost of capital is the pre-tax weighted average cost of capital:
ρτt =
ρetb
E
t−1+ρ
D
t Dt−1
vet−1+Dt−1
. Their metric is here labelled Claimholders’ Residual Income (CRI).24,25 The so-
called Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1989, 1995; Lee, 1999) is
constructed from the point of view of the equity owners, so that the relevant income is the profit after
taxes (pat) resulting from the income statement, and the one-period rate is the return on equity (roe);
the cash flows are the equity cash flows and the opportunity cost of capital is the required return to
equity (aka cost of equity) ρet=(v
e
t − vet−1 + et)/vet−1.
Remark 5. It is worth stressing that each of the three accounting rates originates an IFL for the corre-
sponding cash-flow stream:
∑n
t=1 ftϕt(
−→
roi) =
∑n
t=1 ctϕt(
−→
rol) =
∑n
t=1 etϕt(
−→roe) = 0.
IRR-based RI models (Table 7). These metrics start from the computation of an IRR for the
cash-flow stream. A widespread metric in this class is derived from Madden (1999)’s cash flow return
on investment (cfroi), which is but the IRR of the (inflation-adjusted) free-cash-flow stream, so that∑n
t=1 ft(1+cfroi)
−t=0. Comparing the cfroi with the weighted average cost of capital ρt and multiplying
the spread by the outstanding capital computed from the fundamental recursive eq. (3), the cfroi-based
residual income (RIcfroi) is constructed. Such a metric pertains to an entity approach and a natural
extension of this metric is possible if one considers the claimholders’ point of view. Using the capital-
cash-flow stream to compute the corresponding IRR, one finds what might be named the cash flow return
24Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham (2004) emphasize that if the discount rate for the tax shield is the unlevered cost of assets ρU ,
then the latter coincides with the pre-tax weighted average cost of capital: ρτ = ρU , so that circularity issues are avoided.
25The claimholders’ profit is hinted at in Grant (1998), where it is called levered net operating profit after taxes. However,
the author develops a pre-tax version of EVA different from Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham’s, based as it is on earnings before
interest and taxes (ebit) (which is, by definition, equal to nopatt/(1− τ)); using our symbols, the author defines
Pre-tax EVA = bt−1
[
ebitt
bt−1
− ρ
e
t/(1− τ)vet−1 + ρDt Dt−1
vet−1 +Dt−1
]
so that EVA=Pre-tax EVA(1 − τ). While the discounted sum of the EVAs gives the project’s NPV, the discounted sum
of these Pre-tax EVAs only leads to a pre-tax NPV: one has to multiply by (1− τ) to reach the NPV (see also Abate and
Grant, 2002).
on liabilities (cfrol):
∑n
t=1 ct(1 + cfrol)
−t=0. Comparing cfrol with ρτt , the cfrol-based claimholders’
residual income (RIcfrol) is carried out. Analogously, an equity approach leads to the computation of the
cash-flow return on equity (cfroe) as the IRR of the equity-cash-flow stream:
∑n
t=1 et(1+cfroe)
−t=0. This
equity IRR, compared to the cost of equity ρet , gives rise to the cfroe-based residual income (RI
cfroe).26
Market-based models (Table 8). This class is based on market values. Except at time 0, where
capital invested is equal to the initial outlay, the market value of capital is chosen for t<n, where market
value is defined as the sum of the discounted values of the project’s cash flows at the appropriate cost
of capital. This choice boils down to choosing the cost of capital as the one-period IRR in each period
(except the first one). In particular, Ferna´ndez (2002) adopts a proprietary perspective and endorses the
use of Created Shareholder Value (CSV), which is a reproposal of Bodenhorn’s (1964) (cash-flow based)
pure profit :27 the capital considered is the market value of equity, the relevant cash flows are the equity
cash flows, and the opportunity cost of capital is the required return to equity ρet . This means that the
first-period IRR is r1=(ve1 − e0 + e1)/e0 (see Ferna´ndez, 2002, p. 281), while in the other periods rt=ρet .
Given that Bodenhorn-Ferna´ndez’s metric belongs to the class of standard RI models, the excess profit
in the first period is w0(~r)(r1 − i1)=e0( v
e
1−e0+e1
e0
− ρe1), whereas in the other period is zero. Following an
entity approach Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000) propose the Net Economic Income (NEI), which belongs
to the class of L metrics. For their metric, the authors choose the market value of the firm’s assets,
and the capital charge is computed by taking wt(~ρ) as the lost capital. If one assumes a claimholders’
perspective, the NEI turns into a new metric, which is here labelled Claimholders’ Economic Income
(CEI): the relevant cash flows are the capital cash flows and the opportunity cost of capital is the pre-tax
weighted average cost of capital ρτ .
Remark 6. It is worth noting that NEI, CEI and L(CSV) (the lost-capital companion of CSV) belong to
the class of KEP models defined in eq. (30): all of the three metrics coincide with the periodic variation
of user cost and satisfy (strong and) robust goal congruence.
A twofold classification of the nine metrics (according to the notion of capital and according to the
perspective taken) is summarized in Table 9.
7 A numerical example
The L theory is a further addition to the toolkit of the financial engineer: valuation theory may now
be said to consist of ten basic methodologies, four of which are based on cash flows, three are based
on S residual income, and the remaining three are based on L residual income (see Table 10). All ten
methods are logically consistent and give the same result (in the RI models the initial outlay must be
obviously added to the NPV to reach the value). Consider a firm that is incorporated to undertake a
5-year project. Tables 11 and 12 collect the input data (in boldface), the firm’s accounting statements,
the resulting expected cash flows and rates of return, while Table 13 employs the APV method and the
three DCF techniques to find the market values. To this end, it is assumed that ρU is exogenously given
26It is evident that cfroi, cfrol, and cfroe, may be viewed, respectively, as constant roi, rol, and roe.
27See also Dutta and Reichelstein (2005, section 3).
and that nominal debt is equal to market value of debt, which means δt = ρDt and It=ρ
D
t Dt−1. The
market value of equity is 22,134 and the NPV turns out to be N0=v0− f0=ve0− e0=1,134. Logically, the
four methods give the same result (see Ferna´ndez, 2002, 2007, for a review of these valuation methods).
Table 14 focusses on the 3+3 groups of metrics, and the RIs are calculated for each period. Logically,
each of them represents a decomposition of N0=1,134, which is obtained by the Discount&Sum procedure
for the S metrics and by the Sum&Discount method for the L metrics. Inspecting Table 14, the reader
may appreciate the considerable differences across paradigms and across metrics. It is worth noting
that the KEP metrics are perfectly aligned in sign with Nt (robust goal congruence). The fact that
most of the IRR-based metrics in the example have the same sign as Nt in each year does not hold in
general. As a counterexample, consider the standard IRR-based metrics and suppose that the first-year
sales are equal to 13,410, other things equal: one finds NPV=3.6 and the vectors of the three metrics
turn out to be, respectively, (−54.7, −30.3, −14.1, 51.6, 89.1), (5.6, 2.0, −0.2, 0.2, −1.9), and (144.2,
74.3, 25, −138.2, −248.8). Contrasting S metrics with L metrics, the discrepancies may be enormous;
for example, considering ρU=23%, other things equal, the NPV is N0=−5,977 and it is easily checked
that in the third period the accounting-based standard metrics signal positive performances: EVA=417,
CRI=399, EBO=218, whereas their L companions are deeply negative L(EVA)=−1136 L(CRI)=−1276,
L(EBO)=−2874. As a result, the use of either theory for executive compensation may well impact on
managers’ compensation in profoundly opposite ways.
8 Conclusion
This papers presents a review of the notion of residual income, also known as excess profit. This concept
has gone a long road since its origins in the last years of the 19th century (see the synopsis in Table
15). The relation residual income bears to value had been recognized early, but only in relatively recent
years it has been thoroughly investigated in various fields: accounting, corporate finance, financial math-
ematics. This relation has proved useful for valuation purposes and performance analysis, and the use
of residual income as a governance tool is at the core of the well-entrenched value-based management
literature: linking management compensation to periodic performance is a way for aligning managers’
and shareholders’ objectives and reduce agency costs.
This paper stresses the role of income and opportunity cost as the two basic ingredients of residual
income. The role of counterfactual conditionals in the definition of opportunity cost, highly neglected in
the literature, is here emphasized, so that opportunity cost is defined as the counterfactual income the
investor would (have) earn(ed) if she (had) rejected the project. The undoing of the factual scenario in
the standard residual income theory implies that only the return rate is undone. In the systemic-value-
added approach, aka lost-capital paradigm, the capital is undone as well so that the lost income is given
by the product of the opportunity cost of capital times the capital that the investors would have owned if
they had invested in the counterfactual course of action. The new paradigm is naturally embraced in an
arbitrage theory perspective and set interesting relations to the notion of depreciation: both depreciation
through time and depreciation through use are lumped together. This link is provided by Keynes’s
(1936) user cost (depreciation through use), which is a basic ingredient of the lost-capital theory. The
procedure for computing the project value in the two theories is, so to say, specular: a Discount&Sum
procedure in the standard paradigm, a Sum&Discount procedure in the lost-capital paradigm. The latter
procedure unmasks an aggregation property which enables to neutralize the role of timing in forecasting:
it is not necessary to know when residual incomes are generated. This induces a simple heuristic for
valuation: rather than forecasting each and every residual income one may rest on an average residual
income. The new paradigm is also capable of retrieving the average of one-period (e.g accounting)
rates weighted by the undiscounted capitals (e.g. book value): dismissed in the accounting literature as
nonsignificant, this plain vanilla average represents the project’s average yield as seen from the lost-capital
theory perspective; the IRR itself may be seen as a generalized weighted average of outstanding capitals.
Moreover, it is possible to interpret the lost-capital RI as a standard RI with a comprehensive cost of
capital and a Sum&Discount conservation property, which allows for a generalized definition of residual
income encompassing both paradigms (see Definition 2).
The standard notion of residual income has triggered a flourishing literature on various problems and
perspectives: decisions on investments, production, sales; implementation of optimal portfolio strategies;
short-run policies as proxies for long-run policies; conflicts between principal and agent; forecasts of asset
prices and valuation of intrinsic values. Hopefully, the theoretical enlargement of the set of performance
measures with the lost-capital residual income will attract interest of academics and stimulate research
on its possible use for managerial and financial applications. However, using a single theory or “using
only a single measure cannot necessarily achieve all of the objectives usually required of such a measure”
(Bromwich and Walker, 1998, p. 404). No single theory or metric can be said to be the “best” index.
Both theories, along with their corresponding metrics, could fruitfully be conjoined in a multicriteria
approach to provide appropriate models satisfying the needs of the evaluator to solve specific decision
problems. To this end, the use of vague theories such as fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965; Zimmermann, 2001)
or supervaluationist logic (Keefe, 2000, 2008; Qizilbash, 2003) might perhaps prove helpful.
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Table 0a. Main Notational Conventions
Symbol Meaning Formalization
A project (firm)
at; a
∗
n cash flow; time-n cash flow from operations
~a; ~at project’s, sub-project’s cash-flow vector (−a0, a1, . . . , an);(~0t−2,−wt−1, wt + at,~0n−t)
bt Book value of assets
ct Capital cash flow et + dt or rolt · vt−1 + (vt−1 − vt)
dt Installment, Cash flow to debt ct − et or δtDt−1 + (Dt−1 −Dt)
Dt Debt (nominal value=market value)
∑n
k=t+1 dk
ϕk(ρ
D)
ϕt(ρD)
δt nominal debt rate It/Dt−1
∆ Variation
et equity cash flow ct − dt or roet · vet−1 + (vet−1 − vet )
F Financial asset
Ft; F
t Factual, counterfactual value of asset F Ft−1(1 + it)+at; F t−1(1 + it)
ft Free cash flow ct − τIt or roit · vt−1 + (vt−1 − vt)
ϕt(~ı); ϕt(~r) Discount factors
[∏t
k=1(1 + ik)
]−1
;
[∏t
k=1(1 + rk)
]−1
i, it, ~ı Opportunity cost of capital (scalar, vector)
i∗ Comprehensive cost of capital it ·
(
1 +
wt−1(~ı)−wt−1(~r)
wt−1(~r)
)
It interest on debt δtDt−1
L Lost capital
n∗ time n, prior to distribution of Rn
N0, N0(~a) Project’s Net Present Value −a0 +∑nt=1 atϕt(~ı)
N0(~at) Sub-project’s NPV −ϕt−1(~ı)wt−1 + ϕt(~ı)(wt + at)
Nt Project’s time-t Net Present Value N0
∏t
k=1(1 + ik)
Nn Project’s Net Final Value N0
∏n
k=1(1 + ik)
pit Income at + (wt − wt−1)
piet Standard residual income wt−1(rt − it)
Πet Lost-capital residual income rtwt−1(~r)− itwt−1(~ı)
p Portfolio traded in the capital market
p0 price of p
∑n
t=1 atϕt(~ı)
rt one-period (internal) rate of return
wt−wt−1+at
wt−1
r, ~r internal rate of return/financial law
∑n
t=1 at(1 + r)
−t=0;
∑n
t=1 atϕ(~r)=0
r∗, r∗L project’s average yield
∑n
t=1 rtϕt(~ı)wt−1(~r)∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ı)wt−1(~r)
;
∑n
t=1 rtwt−1(~r)∑n
t=1 wt−1(~r)
Rn Terminal (scrap) value an − a∗n
ρ Weighted average cost of capital
ρetv
e
t−1+ρ
D
t Dt−1(1−τ)
vet−1+Dt−1
ρD; ρe Cost of debt; Cost of equity
Dt−Dt−1+dt
Dt−1 ;
vet−vet−1+et
vet−1
ρU Unlevered cost of equity (cost of assets)
ρτ Pre-tax weighted average cost of capital
ρetv
e
t−1+ρ
D
t Dt−1
vet−1+Dt−1
S Standard
τ tax rate
vt, v
e
t Market value, equity value of the project/firm
∑n
k=t+1 fk
ϕk(~ρ)
ϕt(~ρ)
;
∑n
k=t+1 ek
ϕk(~ρ
e)
ϕt(~ρe)
vU Market value of the unlevered firm
∑n
k=t+1 fk
ϕk(~ρ
U )
ϕt(~ρU )
wt outstanding capital wt−1 + pit − at
wt(~r); wt(~ı) Factual, counterfactual capital wt−1(~r)(1 + rt)− at; wt−1(~ı)(1 + it)− at
Wt; W
t Factual, counterfactual investor’s wealth Wt−1
(
1 +
rtwt−1+itFt−1
wt−1+Ft−1
)
; W t−1(1 + it)
Table 0b. Acronyms
Acronym Meaning Formalization
APV Adjusted Present Value
cfroi Cash flow return on investment IRR of (−f0, f1, . . . , fn)
cfrol Cash flow return on liabilities IRR of (−c0, c1, . . . , cn)
cfroe Cash flow return on equity IRR of (−e0, e1, . . . , en)
CRI Claimholders’ Residual Income see Table 6
CSV Created Shareholder Value see Table 8
DCF Discounted-cash-flow
ebitt Earnings before interest and taxes
nopatt
1−τ or roit · bt−1/(1− τ)
EBO Edwards-Bell-Ohlson’s Residual Income see Table 6
EVA Economic Value Added see Table 6
IFL Internal Financial Law {rt} such that
∑n
t=1 atϕ(~r) = 0
IRR Internal rate of return rt=r for all t such that
∑n
t=1 at(1 + r)
−t = 0
KEP Keynesian excess profit see eq. (30)
CEI Claimholders’ Economic Income see Table 8
MM Modigliani and Miller
NEI Net Economic Income see Table 8
nopatt Net operating profit after taxes roit · bt−1
NPV Net Present Value
∑n
t=1 atϕt(~ı)− a0
patt Profit After Taxes roet · bet−1
RI Residual income (excess profit) see eq. (4)
RIcfroi cfroi-based Residual Income see Table 7
RIcfrol cfrol-based Residual Income see Table 7
RIcfroe cfroe-based Residual Income see Table 7
roet Return on equity
patt
bet−1
roit Return on investment
nopatt
bt−1
rolt Return on liabilities
patt+It
bt−1
or nopatt+τItbt−1
VTS Value of Tax Shield
∑n
t=1 τItϕt(ρ
D)
Table 1. The income schema
pit at wt
Microeconomics personal income consumption consumer’s wealth
Accounting earnings distribution to claimholder equity or entity value
Capital budgeting return cash flow to investor project balance
Security analysis return cash flow to stockholder stock’s value
Loan contract interest installment principal (residual debt)
Table 2. Synonyms
Abnormal earnings (Ohlson, 1989, 1995; Francis, Olsson and Oswald, 2000; Yee, 2005; Revsine,
Collins and Johnson, 2005)—— Abnormal gain (Grant, 1998)—— Abnormal profit (Bromwich
and Walker, 1998)—— Adjusted income (Peasnell, 1981, 1982)—— Adjusted profit (Carsberg,
1966)—— Economic income (Grant, 1998)—— Economic profit (Archer and D’Ambrosio,
1972; Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Rao, 1992; Ehrbar, 1998; Grant, 1998; Martin and Petty,
2000; Fabozzi and Grant, 2000; Arnold, 2000, 2005, 2007; Magni, 2008b) —— Economic Rent
(Cnossen, 1998; Ehrbar, 1998)—— Economic Value Added (Rogerson, 1997; Ehrbar, 1998;
Magni, 2000a,b,c; 2001a,b; 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006); Stoughton and Zechner (2007)—— Excess
earnings (Preinreich, 1936; Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs, 1996)—— Excess economic income
(Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs, 1996)—— Excess income (Peasnell, 1982)—— Excess profit
(Preinreich, 1937, 1938; Edwards and Bell, 1961; Weaver and Weston, 2003; Magni, 2001b, 2004,
2006)—— Excess realizable profit (Edwards and Bell, 1961)—— Excess return (Rendleman,
1978; Damodaran, 2006) Financial margin (Peccati, 1987, 1989, 1991; Marena, 1991a; Camillo
and Marena, 1994) Period contribution (Peccati, 1989)—— Period margin (Gallo and Pec-
cati, 1993; Pressacco and Stucchi, 1997)—— Profit (Anthony, 1975; Reynolds, 1963)—— Pure
earnings, pure profit (Bodenhorn, 1964; Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Cnossen, 1998)—— Quasi-
rent (Peasnell, 1981)—— Residual earnings (Ohlson, 2003; Pope and Wang, 2003; Penman,
2007)—— Residual (capital) return (Grant, 1998)—— Residual income (Solomons, 1965;
Tomkins, 1975; Emmanuel and Otley, 1976; Kay, 1976; Mepham, 1980; Peasnell, 1981, 1982;
Ohlson, 1989, 1995; Grant, 1996; Bromwich and Walker, 1998; Ehrbar, 1998; Biddle, Bowen and
Wallace, 1999; Lee, 1999; Arnold, 2000; Martin and Petty, 2000; Magni, 2000a, 2003; Lundholm
and O’Keefe, 2001; Martin, Petty and Rich, 2003; Mowen and Hansen, 2008)—— Super-profit
(Leake, 1921; Edey, 1957; Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 1990; Bromwich and Walker, 1998;
Ferna´ndez, 2002)—— Supernormal profit (Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch, 1984)—— Surplus
profit (Dicksee, 1897; Carsberg, 1966)—— Value added (Tham and Ve´lez-Pareja, 2004)
Table 3. Arbitrage strategy
Cash flows
Time 0 1 2 . . . n
Long position on A −a0 a1 a2 . . . an
Short position on p p0 −a1 −a2 . . . −an
Long position on p −(p0 − a0) 0 0 . . . Γ
Total 0 0 0 . . . Γ
Table 4. Arbitrage strategy: netting out positions on p
Cash flows
Time 0 1 2 · · · n
Long position on A −a0 a1 a2 · · · an
Net short position on p a0 −a1 −a2 · · · −(an − Γ)
Total 0 0 0 . . . Γ
Table 5. The lost capital wt(i) in the literature
Label Authors
External financing Pressacco and Stucchi (1997)
Balance of the shadow project Magni (2000-2006. See References)
Invested capital Schueler (2000), Drukarczyk and Schueler (2000)
Initial investment not recovered Ve´lez-Pareja (2001)
Adjusted invested capital Young and O’Byrne (2001)†
Unrecovered capital O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002)
Lost capital Magni (2007)
†Only under the assumption earnings=cash flows
Table 6. Accounting-based residual income
IFL Fundamental Equation Residual Income
EVA roit =
nopatt
bt−1
bt = bt−1(1 + roit)−ft bt−1(roit − ρt)
CRI rolt =
nopatt+τIt
bt−1
bt = bt−1(1 + rolt)−ct bt−1(rolt − ρτt )
EBO roet =
patt
bet−1
bet = b
e
t−1(1 + roet)−et bet−1(roet − ρet)
Table 7. IRR-based residual income
IFL Fundamental Equation Residual Income
RIcfroi cfroi wt
(
cfroi
)
= wt−1
(
1+cfroi
)−ft wt−1(cfroi)(cfroi− ρt)
RIcfrol cfrol wt
(
cfrol
)
= wt−1
(
1+cfrol
)−ct wt−1(cfrol)(cfrol− ρτt )
RIcfroe cfroe wt
(
cfroe
)
= wt−1
(
1+cfroe
)−et wt−1(cfroe)(cfroe− ρet)
Table 8. Market-based residual income
IFL Fundamental Equation Residual Income
NEI r1=v1−f0+f1f0 ; rt=ρt v1=f0(1+r1)−f1; vt=vt−1(1+ρt)−ft f0(r1 − ρ1); ρtvt−1−ρtwt−1(ρt)
CEI r1=v1−c0+c1c0 ; rt=ρ
τ
t v1=c0(1+r1)−c1; vt=vt−1(1+ρτt )−ct c0(r1 − ρτ1); ρτt vt−1−ρτtwt−1(ρτt )
CSV r1=
ve1−e0+e1
e0
; rt=ρet v
e
1=e0(1+r1)−e1; vet=vet−1(1+ρet)−et e0(r1 − ρe1); ρetvt−1−ρetvt−1 = 0
Table 9. Classification of the nine residual income models
Entity approach Claimholders’ approach Equity approach
(Free Cash Flow) (Capital Cash Flow) (Equity Cash Flow)
Accounting-based RI EVA CRI EBO
IRR-based RI RIcfroi RIcfrol RIcfroe
Market-based RI NEI CEI CSV
Table 10. Ten models for valuing a project†
Theory Perspective
Entity Claimholders Equity
APV
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
u)ft + VTS − −
DCF
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ)ft
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
τ )ct
∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
e)et
S-RI

∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ) EVA∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ) RI
cfroi∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ) S(NEI)

∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
τ ) CRI∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
τ ) RIcfrol∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
τ ) S(CEI)

∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
e) EBO∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
e) RIcfroe∑n
t=1 ϕt(~ρ
e) CSV
L-RI

ϕn(~ρ)
∑n
t=1 L(EVA)
ϕn(~ρ)
∑n
t=1 L(RIcfroi)
ϕn(~ρ)
∑n
t=1 NEI

ϕn(~ρτ )
∑n
t=1 L(CRI)
ϕn(~ρτ )
∑n
t=1 L(RIcfrol)
ϕn(~ρτ )
∑n
t=1 CEI

ϕn(~ρe)
∑n
t=1 L(EBO)
ϕn(~ρe)
∑n
t=1 L(RIcfroe)
ϕn(~ρe)
∑n
t=1 L(CSV)
†Time subscripts in the metrics are omitted for notational convenience
Table 11. Input data, Balance Sheet, Income Statement
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
BALANCE SHEET
Gross fixed assets 26 000 26 000 26 000 26 000 26 000 26 000
−cumulative depreciation 0 −5 200 −10 400 −15 600 −20 800 −26 000
Net fixed assets 26 000 20 800 15 600 10 400 5 200 0
Working capital 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 0
NET ASSETS 31 000 25 800 20 600 15 400 10 200 0
Debt 10 000 9 500 8 500 8 000 7 500 0
Equity (book value) 21 000 16 300 12 100 7 400 2 700 0
TOTAL LIABILITIES 31 000 25 800 20 600 15 400 10 200 0
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales 15 300 13 400 17 400 12 400 11 500
Cost of sales 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000
Gen. & Adm. expenses 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Depreciation (straight-line) 5 200 5 200 5 200 5 200 5 200
Earnings before interest and taxes 5 100 3 200 7 200 2 200 1 300
Debt rate (δ) 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Interest 800 760 680 640 600
Profit before taxes 4 300 2 440 6 520 1 560 700
Tax rate 33% 33% 33% 33% 33%
Taxes 1 419 805 2 152 515 231
Profit after taxes 2 881 1 635 4 368 1 045 469
Table 12. Cash flow and rates
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
Equity cash flow (et)† −21 000 7 581 5 835 9 068 5 745 3 169
Capital cash flow (ct) −31 000 8 881 7 595 10 248 6 885 11 269
Free cash flow (ft) −31 000 8 617 7 344 10 024 6 674 11 071
Cash flow to debt (dt) −10 000 1 300 1 760 1 180 1 140 8 100
roi 11.02% 8.31% 23.42% 9.57% 8.54%
rol 11.87% 9.28% 24.51% 10.94% 10.48%
roe 13.72% 10.03% 36.10% 14.12% 17.37%
cfroi 12.26% 12.26% 12.26% 12.26% 12.26%
cfrol 13.32% 13.32% 13.32% 13.32% 13.32%
cfroe 16.81% 16.81% 16.81% 16.81% 16.81%
†et=patt+Depreciation + ∆ Debt − ∆ Working Capital
Table 13. Valuation with APV and DCF methods
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5
Cost of assets (ρU ) 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Cost of debt (ρD=δ) 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
vU 31 207 26 334 22 151 14 785 9 885 0
VTS† 928 738 546 365 183 0
v=vU+VTS 32 134 27 072 22 697 15 150 10 068 0
ve=vU+VTS−D 22 134 17 572 14 197 7 150 2 568 0
ρe 13.64% 13.99% 14.24% 16.27% 23.40%
ve=
∑n
k=t+1 ek
ϕk(ρ
e)
ϕt(ρe)
22 134 17 572 14 197 7 150 2 568 0
ρ 11.06% 10.96% 10.92% 10.51% 9.96%
ve=
∑n
k=t+1 fk
ϕk(ρ)
ϕt(ρ)
−D 22 134 17 572 14 197 7 150 2 568 0
ρτ 11.88% 11.89% 11.90% 11.90% 11.93%
ve=
∑n
k=t+1 ck
ϕk(ρ
τ )
ϕt(ρτ )
−D 22 134 17 572 14 197 7 150 2 568 0
N(~e) 1 134 1 289 1 469 1 679 1 952 2 408
N(~f) 1 134 1 260 1 398 1 550 1 713 1 884
N(~c) 1 134 1 269 1 420 1 589 1 778 1 990
†The discount rate here used for discounting the tax shield is the cost of debt. While this is irrelevant to the subject of
the paper, it is worth noting that there is a lively debate in the literature on the correct discount rate for computing the
tax shield. The reader may be willing to turn to the contributions of Myers (1974), Harris and Pringle (1985), Tham and
Ve´lez-Pareja (2001), Arzac and Glosten (2005), Ferna´ndez (2005), Cooper and Nyborg (2006) on this topic. The readers
may well dismiss the first five rows of the Table, if not in line with their stance, and consider ρe as exogenously given.
Table 14. Performance metrics and its companions
Period 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
EVA −13 −686 2 499 45 39 L(EVA) −13 −685 2 575 −144 −145
CRI −3 −673 2 596 −148 −148 L(CRI) −3 −673 2 516 71 80
EBO 17 −646 2 645 −159 −163 L(EBO) 17 −644 2 556 155 325
RIcfroi 371 339 297 258 227 L(RIcfroi) 371 380 379 377 377
RIcfrol 445 375 314 210 138 L(RIcfrol) 445 428 418 364 336
RIcfroe 665 477 358 39 −179 L(RIcfroe) 665 570 534 327 312
S(NEI) 1 260 0 0 0 0 NEI† 1 260 138 153 163 171
S(CEI) 1 269 0 0 0 0 CEI† 1 269 151 169 189 212
CSV 1 289 0 0 0 0 L(CSV)† 1 289 180 209 273 457
†Keynesian Excess Profit
Table 15. Synopsis
1777 Hamilton makes reference to a counterfactual income to act as a capital charge
1890 Marshall introduces the idea of an excess over a normal profit
1921 Leake uses discounted surplus profits in order to compute goodwill
1936 Keynes introduces the notion of user cost, which is a basic constituent of the market-based
lost-capital residual income
1936-1938 Preinreich acknowledges that value equals book value plus the discounted excess profits
1957 Edey shows, for perpetual streams, that the NPV equals the discounted sum of super-profits
1961 Edwards and Bell show, under a finite-horizon assumption, that the NPV is equal to the
discounted sum of excess realizable profits
1964 Bodenhorn focusses on a two-period horizon and shows that the NPV is equal to the
discounted sum of pure earnings
1965 Solomons introduces the term “residual income”
1966 Weingartner generalizes the notion of internal rate of return by introducing the notion of
internal vector return
1981, 1982 Peasnell investigates in a formal setting relations among residual income, market values,
accounting values, accounting rates of return
1987 Peccati decomposes a project NPV in terms of spread between internal period rates and
opportunity cost of capital and investigates the relations between IRR and internal financial
laws.
1989, 1991 Peccati splits up residual income into equity component and debt component
1991 Stewart propagandizes the use of Economic Value Added, an accounting-based residual
income in an entity perspective
1995 Ohlson finds that, in the long run and under suitable assumptions on the stochastic process
of residual incomes, the future market value is approximated by a function of earnings
1997 Pressacco and Stucchi (i) generalize Peccati’s model, (ii) anticipate O’Hanlon and Peas-
nell’s (2002) Proposition 1, (iii) anticipate the systemic-value-added approach.
2000, 2001 Magni introduces the systemic-value-added (i.e. lost-capital) approach as a new theory of
RI showing its NPV-consistency via a Sum&Discount procedure.
2000, 2001 Drukarczyk and Schueler introduce, in a value-based management context, the invested
capital (equivalent to lost capital) and the Net Economic Income, which is a market-based
lost-capital metric (Keynesian Excess Profit)
2001 Young and O’Byrne introduce the notion of Adjusted EVA, which turns out to be an
accounting-based lost-capital metric if earnings equal dividends
2002 O’Hanlon and Peasnell use unrecovered capital (equivalent to lost capital) to provide
splitting identities that separate realized value from value generated in the past
2004 Pfeiffer shows that no accounting-based measure other than the standard RI is NPV-
consistent via a Discount&Sum procedure
2007 Magni links lost-capital RI with arbitrage theory, Keynes’s user cost, abnormal earnings
growth, Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) investment opportunity approach, Anthony’s (1975)
profit, O’Hanlon and Peasnell’s (2002) splitting identities
